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Abstract
To explain attributions of responsibility for acci-
dents, an information processing model was proposed as
an alternative to the "defensive hypothesis". According
to this alternative model, the predictability of harmful
consequences and not the severity of obtained outcomes is
the single most important determinant of the extent of
attributed responsibility. To simultaneously test the
predictions of both the defensive hypothesis and the in-
formation processing model, subjects read brief accounts
of situations in which the prior probability of an acci-
dent and the severity of obtained consequences was
orthogonally varied. Subjects were then asked to assign
responsibility to the actors described in each story.
Results were consistent with the predictions of the alter-
native model but showed no support for the defensive
hypothesis. These data suggest that the information
processing approach, which emphasizes the estimated prior
predictability of harm, provides an interpretive trameworK
for analyzing attributional judgments without relying on
defensive interpretations
.
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The general theory behind the attribution of respon-
sibility to other people for their behaviors and outcomes
has evolved from Heider's (1958) "naive analysis of action"
which describes the process by which individuals infer
causality for events. According to this analysis, the
average man acts like an amateur scientist to test the
plausibility of various causal explanations for events.
While this process is orderly and "scientific" (Kelley,
1967), it alone cannot predict the attributions made to
others. The more fundamental determinant of assignments of
responsibility, according to Heider, is the particular in-
terpretation of the term "responsibility" the observer
chooses to adopt.
Heider (1958, Chapter 4) suggested that there are five
distinct ways of interpreting responsibility. The first
three of these ways involve unintentional outcomes, while
the last two pertain to intentional consequences. At the
most primitive level (Association) , a person is held
responsible for any action that is merely connected with
him. At the second level (Commission) , the person is
viewed as responsible for any action he causes, even though
he could not have foreseen the consequences of his actions.
At the third level (Foreseeability ) , one is held responsible
only for those consequences he should have foreseen. At
the fourth level (Intentionality) , a person is responsible
only for those effects he foresaw and intended. At
the
final level (Justification) , a person is excused from
responsibility even for consequences he intended if the
circumstances were such that anyone would have acted as he
did. Heider suggests there is a developmental progression
through these five levels from primitive attributions which
ignore intentions to more differentiated attributions which
take into account several factors in the situation, includ-
ing the intentions of the actor. These levels were thought
to correspond, in part, to Piaget's stages of moral develop-
ment; nevertheless, Heider recognized that even mature
adults often make primitive attributions. To account for
these, he suggested that the selection of a causal attribu-
tion can be influenced by motivational biases of the observer
Recently, considerable interest has been directed to
the motivational biases in attributions to which Heider
referred. Level 2 (Commission) and Level 3 (Foreseeability
)
have been the focal point of this interest because the
specification of levels of attributions makes it clear that
assignments of responsibility are very dependent upon the
extent to which the actor is viewed as having foreseen, or
having the ability to foresee, the consequences of his
action. From these empirical investigations the theory
of
defensive attribution has emerged as one of the most
in-
fluential explanations of the process by which
assignments
of responsibility are made.
Walster's 1966 experiment was the first and the most
influential of many attempts to test the assumption that
attributions of responsibility are affected by observers'
self-interests. Walster hypothesized that the need to
assign responsibility for an accident increases with its
severity. In her study, subjects were presented with the
description of an accident in which a person's unattended
car rolls down a hill because of a mechanical failure of
the brakes. Subjects were asked to indicate the extent to
which the car's owner was responsible for the accident.
Consistent with her predictions, Walster found that more
personal responsibility was attributed as the accidental
consequences of the mishap became more serious. Walster
interpreted this finding as evidencing a motivated bias in
attributions. According to this interpretation, the reali-
zation that chance happenings can occur over which one has
no control is threatening. Consequently, a person will
protect himself from acknowledging that he too could be
involved in such an unfortunate event by attributing more
personal responsibility to the actor in a serious accident.
Other researchers (McKillip, 1972; Shaver, 1970a,
1970b; Shaver and Carroll, 1970) have extended the defen-
sive hypothesis to suggest that attributed responsibility
is affected by the relevance of the situation and the
similarity between actor and observer. According to their
reasoning, the observer's need to deny that he too could
be
held responsible for a similar accident is achieved by
assigning less responsibility to actors in relevant situa-
tions as outcomes become more serious. This tendency is
enhanced when the perpetrator is similar to the observer.
Reported results, however, have not provided unequi-
vocal support for this defensive interpretation. In
Walster's original study, the obtained difference between
attributions of responsibility when the accident resulted
in mild damage to the car and when bystanders were severely
injured by the rolling car was not significant for female
subjects. Furthermore, assignments of responsibility were
similar when the car was destroyed (moderate consequence)
and when bystanders were injured (a relatively more severe
consequence) . The other investigations of motivated biases
in attributions have also not supported the defensive in-
terpretation, and replications of Walster's study have
generally failed to show consistent effects of severity on
attributions of responsibility (Crinklaw and Vidmar, 1971;
Shaver, 1970a, 1970b; Shaw and Skolnick, 1971; Stokols and
Schopler, 1973; Walster, 1967).
Methodological Inconsistencies in Previous Research
The inconsistent and often conflicting results may reflect
methodological inconsistencies which obscure the relationship
between attributed responsibility and outcome severity.
Medway and Lowe (1975), for example, suggest that
the unsuc-
cessful replications of Walster's results may have been due
in part to the absence of theoretical prerequisites neces-
sary for the occurrence of defensive attributions. Because
several of the above studies manipulated improbable out-
comes in atypical circumstances, the criterion of high
subject involvement (Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965)
may not have been satisfied. Citing some empirical evi-
dence (Shaver, 1970a; Chaikin and Darley, 1973) suggesting
that identification or perceived similarity with the harm-
doer reduces blaming responses from observers, Ross and
DiTecco (1975) argue that inconsistencies in empathy in-
ducing instructions or perceived similarity manipulations
may also account for some of the conflicting results.
Similarly, Vidmar and Crinklaw (1974) contend that many
of the experiments on attribution of responsibility opera-
tionally created "inferential sets" (Jones and Thibaut,
1958) which were inappropriate in tests of defensive at-
tributions .
Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) have suggested that the
conflicting results in these studies may be due to subjects'
uncertainty about the response required of them. According
to Fishbein and Ajzen, two dimensions or factors underlie
Heider* s levels of responsibility. The first factor is
the developmental or response level of the observer. The
second is the behavioral context in which the action occurs.
Assignment of responsibility is a joint function of both
these factors such that when the response level of the
judgment is specified (as it is by the judge in jury trials)
the observer must examine the behavioral context in order
to attribute responsibility. Alternatively, when the con-
textual level is specified, the response level is deter-
mined solely by the observer (Shaw and Reitan, 1969;
Shaw and Sulzer, 1964). Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) argue
that the inconclusive results of most studies dealing with
the attribution of responsibility are not surprising since
neither the response level nor the contextual level of the
judgments has been specified for the subjects. Because
subjects are given no instructions, their decisions about
responsibility may involve any of the five response levels
and unpredictable results between studies are to be expected.
Fishbein and Ajzen 's criticisms point out again the
ambiguity of dependent measures of responsibility. In
his analysis, Heider emphasized that perceptions of respon-
sibility were fundamentally moral judgments. Many of the
attribution studies used dependent measures which could be
interpreted as indices of legal responsibility (Crinklaw
and Vidmar, 1971; Shaver, 1970a, 1970b; Walster, 1966).
While laws supposedly reflect moral codes, legal respon-
sibility and moral responsibility are not always equivalent.
In empirical investigations it is necessary to ensure that
dependent measures reflect subjects* judgments of the actor's
ral responsibility and not simply their knowledge of legalmo
7sanctions. For example, in Walster's (1966) original study
subjects were presented with a taped description of a
stimulus person and of the accident which involved his car.
The car rolled down a hill because the brake cable broke.
Walster's prediction, partially confirmed by the obtained
results, was that subjects would attribute more respon-
sibility when the consequences of the accident were serious
rather than minor, even though the car's owner had no con-
trol over the severity of the accident. Walster inter-
preted these findings as evidence for ego-motivated biases
in the attribution process.
However, the same finding is explainable by assuming
that subjects understand that legal liability, and compen-
sation demanded for negligent conduct, increases as the
extent of the damage incurred increases. Both morally and
legally one is responsible for any consequences which
accrue because of his irresponsible act. In Walster's
study, subjects perhaps judged the stimulus person negli-
gent for operating a vehicle with defective brakes. He
is therefore responsible for any consequences which occur
because of defective brakes. Legal compensation, but not
necessarily moral responsibility, increase with the
severity of the accident. A confounding of moral culpa-
bility and legal liability in measures of responsibility
is illustrated by other findings reported by Walster (1966
Although "responsibility" increased with severity,
greater
8carelessness of behavior prior to the accident was not
attributed to the stimulus person as the outcome of the
accident became more serious. Thus, the failure to employ
dependent measures which precisely distinguish moral from
legal definitions of responsibility may be another problem
which accounts for some of the discrepancies in reported
results. Moreover, since the positive relationship between
severity of consequences and attributed responsibility is
predicted both by legal codes and by the defensive hypo-
thesis, empirical findings in accordance with Walster's
interpretation may be open to alternative explanations.
Such findings may simply reflect, if imprecise measures
are employed, subjects' knowledge of legal norms, rather
than a defensive reaction on their part.
While it may be that inconsistent results may reflect
methodological inconsistencies, the conflicting results
also tend to cast doubt upon the validity of the defensive
hypothesis itself. The model proposed here rests upon the
assumption that observers are fairly rational processors
of available information and that their attributions of
personal responsibility are not systematically distorted
by motivational or emotional biases.
A Rational Model of Attributions of Responsibility
Heider (1958) defined attributions of responsibility
as moral judgments. If a person is to be evaluated as
morally good or bad, his behavior must be assessed
against
some standard of conduct. The standards which dictate
appropriate behaviors in situations have, according to
Heider, two characteristics: Different people should
perceive the same demands in a given situation, and,
demands should manifest themselves across situations.
These two characteristics of moral standards, consensual
validity and cross-situational consistency, represent the
major criteria for any external or "objective" attribu-
tion (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1971). It is not surprising,
therefore, that moral standards often take on the quality
of objective reality rather than simply subjective per-
ceptions on the part of observers.
The consistency manifested in moral judgments (most
adults can agree whether an action in a particular situa-
tion is morally correct) suggests that there are situa-
tional parameters which are taken into account by observers
to guide their judgments. The defensive interpretation
implies that the important parameters are a) the severity of
obtained consequences, b) the relevance of the situation,
and, c) the perceived similarity between actor and observer.
In contrast, the model proposed here argues that quite
different parameters are important. According to this for-
mulation, the assignment of responsibility to a harmdoer
is the result of a chain of rational judgments which begins
with a consideration of the behavior itself, and is
largely
independent of the severity of any consequences which
actually ensues because of that behavior.
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Judging a person as "responsible" for an accident
means that he has behaved "irresponsibly". That is, the
necessary condition for the attribution of personal
"responsibility" to an actor is the attribution of "ir-
responsibility" to his action. Furthermore, acts can be
judged as responsible or irresponsible regardless of or
prior to their actual outcomes. For example, most ob-
servers would probably agree that driving at night without
headlights is an irresponsible act. Their judgments about
this act do not depend upon or necessitate the observation
of a subsequent accident. This ability to judge acts,
independent of their consequences, suggests that there are
parameters of the behavior, in the context in which it
occurs, which define its responsibility or irresponsibility
According to the reasoning proposed here, these same para-
meters, in turn, greatly influence the extent of personal
responsibility assigned to an actor. Whereas the defen-
sive hypothesis supposes that the predominant contributor
to attributional judgments of this kind is the severity of
obtained outcomes, this model argues that outcome severity
itself plays a negligible part in the ascription of moral
responsibility
.
An Expected-Value Analysis of Behaviors
Any action may be viewed as having a number of
fore-
seeable consequences, each of which has a probability
of
11
occurrence and a valence or value (cf .
,
Edwards,. 1954).
The irresponsibility of an action can be defined and cal-
culated as the total expected value of the anticipated
outcomes associated with that act. With respect to acci-
dental outcomes, the specific concern of this study, an
action has a probability of leading to an accident (nega-
tively valued consequence) , as well as a probability of
producing intended outcomes (positively valued consequences)
In other words, an action has a probability of the occur-
rence of an accident, p(a), and a probability of its non-
occurrence, p(a). The valence or value (v) of the accident
is defined by the probabilities and valences of subsequent
outcomes which are contingent upon the occurrence of the
accident. For example, the expected value of building a
house near a river involves an initial estimate of the
probability that the river will flood. The valence of that
accident is defined by the probabilities and severities of
the outcomes which may occur if the river floods (e.g.
,
the destruction of the house and/or injury to the family) .
The irresponsibility and general evaluation of the behavior
can thus be defined as follows:
Total expected-value of a behavior = p(a) v(a) + p(a) v(a)
where
:
p(a) = probability of the accident, as anti-
cipated by an observer
p(a) = probability that no accident will occur
v(a) = value of the accident, as anticipated
by an observer
v(a) = value of the non-occurrence of the
accident
The value of the accident, v(a), can be further de-
fined in terms of the probabilities and valences of conse-
quences which are contingent upon the occurrence of the
accident
:
n
v(a) = XI p(0.) v(o.)
i=l 1 1
where
:
p (CK ) = probability of the contingent outcomes
v (o^) = valence or severity of those outcomes
Similarly , the value of the non-occurrence of the
accident can be specified in terms of the probabilities and
values of the intended positive outcomes which are anti-
cipated from the behavior.
According to this model, the first judgment in the
attribution process is about the irresponsibility of the act
itself, where irresponsibility can be defined in expected-
value terms. The expected-value formula suggests that an
actor will be held morally responsible for his conduct if
the expected-value of the occurrence of an accident is
greater than the expected-value of its non-occurrence; i.e.,
when the total expected-value of the behavior is negative.
Since the formula uses expected likelihoods, it implies
that an actor will be excused from responsibility if the
outcomes produced by his act were, from the observer's
point of view, truly accidental; i.e., could not have
reasonably been foreseen. For the same reason, the model
conforms to the common observation that responsibility can
be assigned or excused regardless of the actual outcomes
which occur. Since the probability of the accident is of
central importance in the evaluations of behaviors, an
actor may be judged to have behaved irresponsibly when his
action had a high prior probability of producing negative
effects even if the actual consequences of that behavior
were positive.
Probabilistic Bias in Attr ibutional Judgments
Since, according to this model, judgments of moral
responsibility are based, in part, on probability judgments,
the attribution process may be influenced by the biases
found to be associated with probability judgments. One
such bias which seems to be particularly relevant for at-
tributions of responsibility was reported by Fischhoff
(1975) . His results show that knowledge that a specific
outcome has already occurred increases the postdicted
likelihood of that outcome. Fischhoff refers to this
tendency to perceive reported outcomes as having been more
inevitable as "creeping determinism" (p. 288) . Perhaps
creeping determinism plays a part in assignments of respon-
sibility. If events which occur are perceived, a posteriori,
14
to have been more likely simply because they occurred,
more responsibility may be attributed to an actor because,
retrospectively, he should have foreseen the likelihood
of the accident. In terms of this discussion, hindsight
may mediate the assignment of responsibility by revising
prior odds of occurrences of events. For example, if an
accident is known to have occurred, the prior probability
of the accident may be postdictively increased as the prior
probability of the accident's non-occurrence is decreased.
From the expected-value formula it can be seen that such
revisions in probabilities decrease the total expected-
value of the behavior and may thereby mediate the extent of
attributed responsibility. It should be noted that while
this tendency to regard actual outcomes as more inevitable
once they have occurred represents a bias in the attribu-
tion process, it is a probabilistic, rather than an ego-
motivated or defensive, bias.
Effect of Severity of Obtained Consequences
It is important to note that the parameters included
in the expected-value analysis refer to potential, rather
than actual, events. This information processing model
argues that the extent of personal responsibility assigned
to an actor is determined primarily by the extent to which
his act was judged irresponsible. The model also assumes
that a judgment of an act's irresponsibility can be made on
15
the basis of the potential outcomes of the behavior, as
anticipated by an observer, and does nor depend upon what-
ever outcomes actually occur. For this reason, the pro-
posed model, in contrast to the defensive hypothesis,
suggests that the severity of actually obtained consequences
does not appreciably influence the attribution of respon-
sibility. However, if the creeping determinism effect
occurs, the severity of obtained consequences may indirectly
influence the extent of personal culpability assigned to
the actor.
Consider the simplest case in which an accident can
produce either of two mutually exclusive outcomes, one
mild and the other severe. Knowing that the accident
occurred and resulted in one of the two outcomes may lead
to retrospective increases in both the probability of the
accident and the probability of the obtained outcome. Since
the revised probability estimate is weighted by a severity/
value factor, and since the severity of the serious conse-
quence is, by definition, greater (more negative) than that
of the mild outcome, the expected value of behaviors which
result in severe consequences may be lower than the ex-
pected value of acts which produce mild outcomes. Because,
according to this analysis, the extent of attributed per-
sonal responsibility is based, in part, on the expected
value of the behavior, more responsibility may therefore
be assigned to actors whose behavior produces serious
16
consequences. While this information processing model,
like the defensive hypothesis, might therefore predict
greater responsibility assigned for severe than for mild
consequences, the reasoning behind the prediction is
fundamentally different in the two models. This analysis
suggests that the severity effect obtains because of
revisions in the probabilities of outcomes and not because
of the severity, per se, of those outcomes. The severity
effect, therefore, need not be interpreted as a manifesta-
tion of observers' defensive tendencies.
Summary
A summary of the main points and predictions of this
alternative mode] may be helpful. The attribution of per-
sonal responsibility to an actor is postulated to begin
with and thus to correlate with the attribution of irrespon-
sibility to his action. Personal responsibility; i.e.,
moral culpability, is attributed to actors who engage in
irresponsible acts. Judgments about the irresponsibility of
one's behavior may be part of a general subjective evaluation
of the action in the context in which it occurs, but they
can be defined in expected-value terms. According to an
expectcd-value analysis, an act is irresponsible if the
expected value of the occurrence of an accident, given the
behavior, is greater than the expected value of its
non-
occurrence. Thus, both the general evaluation of the
act
17
and the extent to which it is deemed irresponsible are pre-
dicted to correlate with its expected value.
The attribution of irresponsibility to an act and the
attribution of responsibility to an actor are assumed to be
related because both are predicted to be influenced by the
same parameter, the probability that the actor's conduct
will lead to or produce an accident.
The defensive hypothesis predicts that the severity
of obtained consequences significantly affects the extent
of attributed responsibility to actors. In contrast, this
model predicts that severity of actual outcomes influences
neither the attributions made to acts nor to actors except
indirectly when the creeping determinism effect produces
postdictive increases in the probabilities of obtained
consequences
.
A secondary interest of this study concerns Fischhoff's
notion of "creeping determinism". His findings suggest
that observer's knowledge that an accident has already
occurred will increase the postdicted likelihood of the
occurrence of the accident as well as the likelihood of the
contingent outcome which ensues. If this retrospective
revision in probabilities were to obtain, it would decrease
the total expected value of the actor's behavior and, in
turn, would result in more attributed personal responsibility
To test this prediction, some subjects were informed of the
occurrence of the accident while others knew only that a
18
potential accident could occur, and their respective at-
tributions were compared.
In the present experiment subjects read a brief ac-
count of a situation in which an accident could potentially
occur. The prior probability of the accident (Low or High)
,
outcome knowledge (Informed or Uninformed about whether
the potential accident actually occurred) , and outcome
severity (Mild or Severe) were experimentally varied. Thus
the design was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial. After reading the
stories subjects were asked to answer a series of questions
designed to measure their assessment of the action itself,
the probabilities and valences of outcomes associated with
that action, and the extent to which they felt that the
perpetrator was or would be responsible for the accident.
METHOD
Stimulus Materials
The principal components of the proposed model of the
attribution of responsibility are the probabilities and
valences of outcomes associated with the actor's behavior.
Pilot subjects were used to generate estimates of these
parameters
.
Five stories in which an accident could potentially
occur were presented to pilot subjects. There were two
versions of each story. The versions differed in that the
19
circumstances in which the behavior occurs was varied.
In one version the actor's behavior was relatively likely
to lead to an accident. In the other, the situational
factors were such that the same behavior was less likely
to result in an accident. In both versions the descrip-
tions specified two consequences which could result from
the potential accident, one of relatively mild severity
(property damage or slight injury) , the other of a more
serious nature (serious injury or death) . The task of the
pilot subjects was to estimate the probabilities and
valences of the outcomes associated with the actor's be-
havior in each situation. Subjects were asked first to
estimate the probability that an accident would occur in
the situation and, secondly, to estimate the probabilities
of both the outcomes of the accident. Lastly, they were
asked to estimate the likelihood that the accident would
not occur. These measures established the normative prior
probabilities of the events depicted in the stories. In
order to determine the valence of those events, subjects
rated the desirability of each of the probable outcomes in
the situation. To ensure that obtained results would not
be specific to the details of a particular story, four
different pairs of stories were then selected from the pre
test pool. The four stories chosen were those in which
a
clear difference was perceived between the two versions
in
the likelihood of an accident.
20
Subjects
A total of 120 subjects participated in the actual
experiment. The subjects were undergraduates enrolled in
introductory psychology courses who participated in the
study as part of their course requirements.
Procedure
Subjects first were randomly assigned to one of two
experimental conditions. In one condition (Low probability),
subjects read descriptions of situations in which the prior
probability of an accident was judged (by pilot subjects)
to be low. Other subjects (High probability) read the
other version of the same story in which the prior prob-
ability of the accident was relatively high. One low
probability story, for example, presented subjects with
the following information:
The state of Colorado voted to build a dam on
the Platte river in order to store more water
for the growing city of Denver. Before the
dam was completed, William Smith and his family
decided to build a house on land they owned_
near the banks of the Platte river, downstream
of the proposed dam site. Mr. Smith knew that
if the river flooded before the dam was com-
pleted, it could ruin the house and endanger
the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their
21
three children. On the other hand, Mr. Smith
also knew that the Platte had never flooded
before and that spring rainfall was, on the
average, decreasing every year so it seemed
highly unlikely that the river would flood
again before the dam was built. With this in
mind, he went ahead and built the house.
In contrast, the high probability version of the story reads
as follows:
The state of Colorado voted to build a dam on
the Platte river in order to store more water
for the grov/ing city of Denver. Before the
dam was completed, William Smith and his
family decided to build a house on land they
owned near the banks of the Platte river,
downstream of the proposed dam site. Mr.
Smith knew that the Platte river had flooded
three times during the past eight years be-
cause of heavy spring rains and meltina snow.
If the river flooded again before the dam was
completed, it could ruin the house and en-
danger the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Smith and
their three children. Mr. Smith also knew
that the spring rainfall was, on the average,
decreasing every year and that the Platte
hadn't flooded since 1973 so it probably
wouldn't flood again before the dam was built.
With this in mind, he went ahead and built
the house.
The second variable of interest is outcome knowledge.
Subjects within each probability condition (Low or High)
were divided randomly into two groups. Subjects assigned
to the Informed group were told that an accident did, in
fact, occur. They also knew which of the two consequences
of the accident occurred. Other subjects (Uninformed
group) received no information about the actual consequences
of the actor's behavior but knew that an accident could
occur and could result in either of the two consequences of
differing severity.
The third manipulated variable concerns the severity
of outcomes. Subjects within each outcome-knowledge con-
dition were further divided into two groups. Some subjects
in the Informed group read that the accident occurred and
produced the mildly severe outcome. The remaining subjects
in the Informed group read that thu consequences of the
actor's behavior were more serious. To illustrate, using
the above example, Informed subjects in the Mild outcome
group read:
A few months after the Smith family moved into
their new home, and before the dam was com-
pleted, the Platte river flooded. Although
none of the Smiths were injured in the flood,
the house was ruined.
Informed subjects in the Severe outcome condition received
the following information
:
A few months after the Smith family moved into
their new home, and before the dam was com-
pleted, the Platte river flooded. The house
was ruined and two members of the Smith family
were critically injured as the flood swept
through their house.
Subjects in these groups were asked to judge how respon-
sible or irresponsible was the behavior and how responsible
(morally blame-worthy) was the actor for the consequences
produced by his behavior . Within the Uninformed condition
,
half the subjects were asked to evaluate the behavior and
assign personal responsibility to the actor if the mild
outcome were to occur. The other half of the Uninformed
subjects were asked to make the same judgments of respon-
sibility if the more serious outcome were realized.
Dependent Variables
The principal dependent variables of interest are the
assignments of responsibility to actions and to actors.
Attributions made to actions were assessed by an 8 point
scale which asked subjects simply to rate how responsible
or irresponsible was the behavior in each story. Attri-
butions of personal responsibility to actors were made on
an 8 point scale ranging from "totally responsible" to
"not at all responsible". This measure explicitly
asked
for a judgment of moral and personal responsibility and
not a decision of legal liability.
Each subject also rated the extent to which the
actor's conduct was appropriate or prudent in the situa-
tion. The appropriateness measure was generated from
subjects' responses to five semantic differential items.
Each subject was asked to locate the actor's behavior
along the following dimensions, each anchored at the ex-
tremes: safe-unsafe, wise-unwise, good-bad, morally
right-morally wrong, justif ied-un j ustif ied . The sum of
these responses comprised an index of subjects' evalua-
tions of the perpetrator's act, with higher scores re-
flecting more negative evaluations.
In order to calculate the expected value of the be-
haviors, each subject was asked to estimate the proba-
bilities associated with the potential events described
in each of the four stories. Uninformed subjects made
straight-forward predictions of the likelihoods of both
the occurrence and, later in the questionnaire, the non-
occurrence of the accident. They also estimated the like
lihood of the two conditional outcomes in each situation.
Informed subjects were asked to ignore their knowledge of
the actual consequences and to estimate these likelihoods
"as (they) would have had (they) not known" the particula
outcome in the situations.
The valence or desirability of each of these
potenti
outcomes was also solicited of subjects.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The probability manipulation sought to construct
situations in which the actor's behavior or neglect v/as
likely or unlikely to produce an accident. Subjects were
asked to estimate, from 0% to 100%, the probability that
an accident would occur. Another measure allowed subjects
to estimate the probability that an accident would not
occur. Subjects' estimates of both these parameters sug-
gest that the probability manipulation was accurately
perceived. Subjects who read the low probability versions
of the stories judged the accident to be less likely (X =
35%) than those who read the high probability versions
(X = 63%; F = 187.27, df = 1/112, p < .01). This prob-
ability estimate was, understandably, influenced by the
situational context. This influence was evidenced by a
main effect of the different stories on the probability
estimates. Furthermore, a story x probability interaction
was also obtained: although the probability of harm was
judged to be significantly greater in the high probability
versions, the difference between estimates in the two prob-
ability versions, differed across the four stories. Table 1
presents the average likelihood estimates for each story by
subjects in each experimental group. It might be noted
that the outcome knowledge variable did not affect
estimates
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of the likelihood of the accident. Subjects who knew
the actual chain of events in each story did not assign a
higher probability to the accident than those who did not.
The analysis of variance did reveal a significant
second order interaction of story x probability x outcome
information. In three of the four stories the difference
in likelihood estimates between the low and high versions
was greater when subjects knew the actual outcome in the
situation than when they did not. It is unclear why
estimates of Story #4 deviated from the predominant pat-
tern of interaction depicted in Figure 1.
Subjects' estimates of the likelihood that the acci-
dent would not occur also showed the influence of the prob-
ability manipulation. The average estimate by subjects who
read the low probability versions was 63%, while those who
read the high probability versions judged the likelihood
of the non-occurrence of the accident to be 39% (F = 114.49,
df = 1/112, p < .01). With the exception of the second
order interaction which was not replicated, the probability
of the non-occurrence of the accident exhibited the same
main effects and interactions as were obtained for the
estimates of the occurrence of the accident.
1
1Logically, the probability of the occurrence of an acci-
dent and the probability of its non-occurrence should
equal 1.0. Our results show that while these estimates
were highly inversely related (r = -.70), they were not
perfect complements of one another. The analyses reported
below used the separate estimates of each parameter
provided by subjects.
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FIGURE 1
Interaction of Story x Probability x
Outcome Information on Estimates of the
Likelihoods of the Accidents
Difference in
Likelihood Es-
timates between
Low and High
Probability
Conditions
Uninformed Informed
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In addition to these measures of the probability of
an accident, subjects also estimated the likelihoods of
the accident's mutually exclusive outcomes, as described
in each story. These probabilities were measured contin-
gent upon the occurrence of the accident. For example,
the probability that the actor's home would be damaged
(Mild outcome) or that his family would be injured (Severe
outcome) depended upon the occurrence of the flood. Each
subject estimated the likelihood of both the mild and
severe outcomes, if the accident happened. Since the
probability manipulation sought only to vary the prob-
ability of the accident, the likelihoods of the contingent
outcomes should not be affected. Analyses of variance
were performed on estimates of the likelihood of both the
mild and the severe contingent outcomes. No significant
effects were obtained with respect to the mild outcome.
Estimates of its likelihood were substantially the same
in both low and high probability conditions (X = 52% and
54%, respectively).
The likelihood of the severe outcome v/as, however,
influenced by the probability manipulation. Subjects who
read the low probability versions of the stories judged
the severe outcome to be less probable (X 47%) than
those who read the high probability versions (X = 54%;
F = 10.50, df = 1/112, p <.01). This unexpected finding
suggests that variations in the likelihood of the initial
accident affected the likelihood of the severe contingent
outcome, but not the likelihood of the mild outcome. It
should be noted that although the probability manipulation
created differences in the likelihood of the severe conse-
quence, the magnitude of this effect depended upon the
particular story in which it was embedded, as evidenced
by the significant probability x story interaction. In-
dividual comparisons of the cell means (Table 2) revealed
that the severe outcome was viewed as significantly less
likely in the low probability versions of only two of the
stories, but of about equal probability in the other two
stories. This interaction is depicted in Figure 2. The
summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table
3.
The valence of consequences manipulation was accurately
perceived. Severe consequences were judged less desirable
(X = 6.74) than mild consequences (X = 5.10; t = 17.81,
p < .01). To determine if the undesirability of the out-
comes was affected by other variables, analyses of variance
were performed. The perceived severity of the mild out-
come varied across the four stories; some mild outcomes
were, of course, judged more serious than others. The
analysis also revealed a story x probability interaction
for the mild outcome. In three of the four stories, the
mild outcome was viewed as significantly less desirable
when the probability of an accident was low than when
it
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FIGURE 2
Extimated Likelihood of the
Severe Consequence as a Function
of the Probability of an Accident
Across Different Stories
Estimated
Likel ihood
of Severe
Consequence
.7
.6
. 5
. 4
. 3
.2
. 1
. 63
. 62
Low High
Probability
TABLE 3
Summary of Analysis of Variance
of Likelihood of the Severe Consequence
Source df no T?r
Probability (P) 1 • U u Z. ±
Outcome
Information (I) 1 .1763 3.074
Valence of
Consequences (V) 1 .1687 2.942
Pxl 1 .0440 .7687
PxV 1 .033 .581
IxV 1 .0187 .326
IxPxV 1 .0003 .005
Between Groups
Error 112 .0573
Story (S) 3 1.3229 46.170**
SxP 3 .4034 14.081**
Sxl 3 .0046 . i b u y
SxV 3 .0094 .330
SxIxP 3 .0128 .4469
SxIxV 3 .0014 .051
SxPxV 3 .039 1.366
SxPxIxV 3 .070 2.448
Error 336 .02865
** p < .01
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was high. When the probability of the accident is high,
subjects apparently perceive that greater damage or injury
could have occurred and the mild outcome is thus seen as
less severe. Figure 3 shows the pattern of this inter-
action .
The analysis of the undesirability of the severe
outcome showed no main effects or interactions.
Primary Analysis
The principal contention of the proposed model is
that the attribution of personal responsibility to an
actor is based upon and influenced by the extent to which
his act is deemed irresponsible. A preliminary assumption
is that a judgment of the irresponsibility of an action
is part of a more general evaluation of that act. To
test this assumption, subjects' judgments about the ir-
responsibility of the behavior were correlated with the
five item evaluative index. The obtained correlation,
.88, confirms this initial assumption. More importantly,
both the general evaluation of the behavior and its per-
ceived irresponsibility were found to reflect estimable
parameters of the situation; i.e., probabilities and
valences. The expected-value of the behaviors in each
of
the four stories was calculated according to the
formula
presented above (page 10). It was highly related both
to the perceived irresponsibility of the act
(r = -.54,
FIGURE 3
Perceived Undesirability of the Mild
Consequence as a Function of Probability
and Story
Perceived
Undesirability
6. 02
4.40 —
Low High
Probability
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measures of responsibility (to actions and to actors) were
submitted to analyses of variance. Tables 5 and 6 present
the cell means of these dependent measures under each of
the experimental conditions. The results of the analyses
of variance are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Both mea-
sures were strongly influenced by the probability manipula-
tion. An act was judged more irresponsible if it was more
likely to lead to an accident than if it was not (F =
87.58, df = 1/112, p < .01). Likewise, more personal
responsibility was assigned to the actors in the high prob-
ability versions of the stories than in the low (F =
40.58, df = 1/112, p < .01). These findings tend to sup-
port the hypothesis that the probability of harm is a
central consideration in attributions of responsibility
to persons, and in the perceived irresponsibility of their
actions
.
Secondly, both measures, like the estimates of prob-
abilities, were uniformly influenced by the context in
which the behavior occurred; i.e., a main effect of the
different stories was obtained.
Third, Figures 4 and 5 show that a similar pattern
of story x probability interaction was obtained in both
measures. Although actions were judged more irresponsible,
and actors more personally culpable, in the high prob-
ability versions of each story, the differences between
and high versions varied across stories. Individual
37
p ^ .01) and to the evaluation of the behavior (r = -.57,
p < .01). As the expected value of the behavior decreased
there was a strong tendency to evaluate it more negatively
and to perceive it as more irresponsible.
This correlational evidence confirms the expected
relationship between the attribution of irresponsibility
to an action, the general evaluation of that action, and
its expected value. The next step in this analysis ex-
amines the relationship between attributions of irrespon-
sibility to actions and attributions of responsibility to
actors. The predicted relationship between these different
measures of responsibility was obtained (r = .58, p <.01).
Attributed personal responsibility was, as expected, also
related to the general negative evaluation of the action
(r = .59, p <.01), and inversely related, but to a
lesser extent, to its expected-value (r= -.27, p < .05).
These correlations are presented in Table 4
.
Having established that the extent of responsibility
assigned to an actor varies directly with the perceived
irresponsibility of the action, it is now possible to
assess the effects of the independent variables on these
attributions. The proposed model asserts that the ir-
responsibility of the action and the responsibility as-
signed to an actor are related because they are both in-
fluenced by the same variable, the probability of the
accident. To test this prediction, the data for both
38
TABLE 4
Correlations Among Measures of Attributed
Responsibility and Evaluations of the Action
Resp (act)
Eval (act)
E.V. (act)
Resp (actor)
Resp (act)
1.00
. 878
-.537
. 578
Eval (act) E.V.(act)
-.574
. 592 -.275
Resp (act) = amount of responsibility/irresponsibility
attributed to the action
Eval (act) = general negative evaluation of the action
E.V. (act) = expected-value of the action
Resp (actor) = amount of personal responsibility attributed
to the actor
TABLE 5
Average Amount of Irresponsibility Assigned to
Actions Across Experimental Conditions
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Probability
Uninformed
Mild Severe
Outcome Outcome
Informed
Mild Severe
Outcome Outcome
Low 4.48 4.45 4.18 4.73
High 6.25 6.47 5.88 6.20
TABLE 6
Average Amount of Personal Responsibility Assigned
to Actors Across Experimental Conditions
Uninformed Informed
Mild Severe Mild Severe
Probability Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Low 4.92 5.03 4.00 4.05
High 5.65 5.87 5.45 5.60
TABLE 7
Summary of Analysis of Variance
of Attributed Responsibility to the Actor
Source df MS F
Probability (P) 1 156.408 40.578**
Outcome
Information (I) 1 42.008 10.898**
Valence of
Consequences (V) 1 2.133 .553
Pxl 1 15.408 3.997*
PxV 1 .300 .077
IxV 1 .133 .034
PxIxV 1 .001 .001
Between Groups
Error 112 3.854
Story (S) 3 96.347 45.981**
SxP 3 15.158 7.23**
Sxl 3 .813 .388
SxV
SxPxI
SxIxV
SxPxV
SxPxIxV
Error
3 1.005 .479
3 3.358 1.602
3 3.161 1.508
3 2.050 .978
3 4.594 2.129
336 2,095
** p < .01
TABLE 8
Summary of Analysis of Variance
of Attributions of Irresponsibility to Actions
Source df MS F
Probability (P) 1" 362.27 87 . 58**
Outcome
Information (I) 1 3.17 .77
Valence of
Consequences (V) 1 8.27 2.00
Pxl 1 2.85 .69
IxV 1 3.50 .85
PxV 1 .01 .01
PxIxV 1 1.75 .42
Between Groups
Error 112 4 .136
Story (S) 3 17 . 02 6 . 15**
SxP 3 31 . 17 11.27**
Sxl 3 5.22 1.87
SxV 3 1.27 .47
SxPxI 3 .95 . 34
SxIxV 3 3.074 1.11
SxPxV 3 .874 .315
SxPxIxV 3 6 .28 2.67
Error 336 2 .77
** p < .01
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FIGURE 4
Perceived Irresponsibility of the Action
as a Function of Probability Across
Different Stories
Perceived
Irresponsibility
of the Act 4.23
3. 33
Low High
Probability
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FIGURE 5
Attributions of Personal Responsibility
to the Actor as a Function of Probability
Across Different Stories
Responsibility
Attributed
to the Actor
4 .35
2.8
6.14
5.86
5.68
4.86
Low High
Probability
comparisons between the cell means for both measures
showed that the difference between low and high probability
conditions was significant in each of the stories.
Neither of the other two manipulated variables, out-
come information or severity of consequences, was found to
affect the attribution of irresponsibility to actions.
It appears then that the prior probability of harm in-
fluences the perceived irresponsibility of an act, but the
severity of whatever consequences ensue does not.
The analysis of variance did reveal that the kind of
outcome information subjects were given influenced the
amount of personal responsibility they assigned to the
actor himself. Subjects who knew that the actor's be-
havior or neglect produced negative consequences assigned
less responsibility (X = 4.77) than those who were asked
to assign responsibility if, hypothetical! y , an accident
occurred and led to negative outcomes (X = 5.37; F = 10.90,
df = 1/112, p < .01). This result suggests that subjects
can, if instructed to do so, ignore (or perhaps even over-
compensate for) their knowledge of the consequences of an
actor's conduct when assigning personal responsibility to
him.
A significant interaction between probability and
outcome information was also obtained in the analysis of
ttributed personal responsibility. Although subjects
ystematically assigned more responsibility to .actors m
the high probability versions of the stories than in the
low probability versions, the discrepancy was greater when
they knew of the actual consequences of the behavior than
when they did not. Table 9 presents the cell means asso-
ciated with this interaction.
The analysis of variance also provided the clearest
test of the predictions of the defensive hypothesis, as
opposed to those suggested by the information processing
model. Contrary to the expectations of the defensive
model, and in support of the position proposed here, the
valence of the actual or hypothetical outcome contributed
virtually nothing to the extent of attributed personal
responsibility. The responsibility assigned for severe
outcomes was substantially the same as for mild outcomes
(X = 5.00 for mild outcomes, 5.14 for severe), nor did out-
come severity have any other significant effects. Thus,
the valence of the outcome affected neither assignments
of personal responsibility nor the perceived irrespon-
sibility of the act, while the probability manipulation
affected both.
Evidence Concerning the "Creeping Determinism" Effect
A secondary purpose of this study was to explore the
issue of retrospective revisions in probability estimates,
and the implication for judgments of responsibility. There
were four opportunities for the "creeping determinism"
46
TABLE 9
Average Amount of Responsibility
Assigned to Actors Across Probability
and Outcome Information Conditions
Probability Uninformed Informed
Low 4.97 4.02
High 5.76 5.52
effect to obtain in each story. Subjects estimated the
likelihood of occurrence and the non-occurrence of the
accident, as well as the likelihoods of the two contin-
gent consequences (mild and severe outcomes) . There was
no significant effect of the outcome knowledge variable
on any of these estimates. Table 10 presents the average
likelihood estimates for these parameters under both out-
come knowledge conditions. It shows no consistent pattern
of results. There was a slight tendency to revise prob-
ability estimates in the predicted direction in three of
the four measures (probability of occurrence and non-occur-
rence of the accident, and probability of the severe out-
come) . However, estimates of the likelihood of the mild
outcome show a slight revision in the opposite direction.
Overall, there was no significant tendency to regard
actual outcomes as more inevitable by subjects who knew
that they had occurred.
DISCUSSION
The information processing model of the attribution
process was proposed as an alternative to the defensive
interpretation of attr ibutional judgments. The defensive
hypothesis asserts that self-serving motives predispose
the observer to attend to and base his assignments of
responsibility principally on the severity of the conse-
quences which follow from the actor's behavior. In
TABLE 10
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Effect of Outcome Information
on- Estimated Likelihoods of Events
Uninformed Informed
Probability of occurrence
of the accident .48 49
Probability of
of the mild
occurrence
consequence .54
Probability of
of severe consequence
occurrence
.49
Probability of non-occurrence
of the accident .52 .49
a. Estimated by those Informed subjects who knew the
Mild outcome occurred.
b. Estimated by those Informed subjects who knew the
Severe outcome occurred
.
c. Since the accident always occurred, the lower estimate
of this parameter by Informed subjects conforms to the
"creeping determinism" prediction
.
contrast, the model proposed here emphasizes the impor-
tance of the observer's assessment of the act itself in
the context in which it occurs, independent of the severity
of any obtained consequences. Furthermore, the model
argues that the assessment of the act is a rational, non-
defensive process which principally involves a considera-
tion of the probability of foreseeable consequences. The
results obtained in this study seem to support the alter-
native explanation
.
According to this interpretation , the attribution of
personal responsibility to an actor is the result of a
series of judgments which begins with an evaluation of
the act itself. The reasoning which guides this assump-
tion is that the necessary condition for the attribution
of responsibility to an actor is the prior attribution of
irresponsibility to his action. The judgment of an act's
irresponsibility was postulated to be part of a general
evaluation of the act, and the obtained correlation, .88,
confirms this assumption. Additionally, both the nprrp-ivpd
irresponsibility of the behavior and its general evaluation
were significantly related to its expected-value . This
finding validates the usefulness of an expected-value
analysis of behaviors and supports the contention that
although evaluative judgments of actions may be subjective,
they can be re-defined in terms of measurable parameters-
probabilities and valences. With respect to the expected-
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value analysis, it should be noted that an action can have
multiple consequences, each associated with a valence.
In this study only two of the possible consequences of an
accident were specified, and none of the positive outcomes
which would accompany the non-occurrence of the accident
were described. A moderate correlation was obtained
between the expected-value of the act and its global
evaluation using this procedure. When more of the poten-
tial consequences are included in the calculation of the
expected-value formula, a higher correlation could, pre-
sumably, be expected.
Since, according to this information processing model,
the attribution of responsibility to actors reflects, in
large part, the attribution of irresponsibility to his
action, the two measures of "responsibility" were expected
to be related. The obtained correlation, .58, supports
this reasoning. Furthermore, the results from the analysis
of variance show that the relationship between attributions
to actions and to actors was, as expected, mediated by
the prior probability of harm.
The positive linear function of probability on
responsibility was independent of the severity of the out-
comes. The lack of any effects due to the seriousness
of
consequences casts further doubt upon the validity of
the
defensive hypothesis. No evidence was found to support
the claim that attributions of responsibility to
acts or
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actors are influenced by the self serving biases Walster
(1966) proposed. These findings serve to support the con-
tention that previous experiments which demonstrated an
effect of the severity manipulation may have confounded
legal responsibility with moral responsibility. Legal
liability; i.e., the compensation demanded for negligent
conduct, is proportional to the extent of damage incurred.
The proposed model of the attribution process argues that
the assignment of personal responsibility is a moral
decision and does not depend upon the severity of realized
outcomes , and the obtained findings support that argument
.
However , both the mild and severe outcomes described in
this study may be considered relatively serious. Future
research should explore the validity of this model when a
wider range of outcome severities are involved.
One unanticipated finding was the effect of outcome
knowledge. Subjects who knew of the actual consequences
of the actor's behavior assigned less personal responsibi-
lity than those who did not. The "creeping determinism"
hypothesis implies that outcome knowledge may prejudice
responsibility judgments if the probability estimates upon
which they depend are postdictively revised. However, no
such revision was found to occur. Furthermore, since the
obtained effect of outcome knowledge on personal respon-
sibility was not replicated in measures of the irrespon-
sibility of the act, and was, in fact, opposite in
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direction to that which would be predicted by the creeping
determinism analysis, this finding should be cautiously
regarded
.
Overall, the obtained results support the proposed
information processing model. Based upon these results,
the following picture of the attribution process seems
to emerge. Assignments of personal responsibility to an
actor are influenced, first of all, by an assessment of the
act itself. Because the evaluation of the act, and the
degree to which it is perceived to be irresponsible are
defined, in large part, by the probability that the
behavior will lead to an accident, the likelihood of the
accident also greatly affects the extent of personal re-
sponsibility assigned to the perpetrator. However, the
relationship between personal responsibility and the prob-
ability of harm is mediated by another variable which was
not directly measured in this study the foreseeabil ity
of the accident. According to the model proposed here,
and consistent with Heider's (1958) analysis of the con-
ceptual distinctions between types of responsibility, an
actor will be held morally blameworthy for the negative
consequences of his behavior to the extent that he could
have anticipated those consequences. Ordinarily, an in-
crease in the probability associated with an event will also
augment the extent to which the event could have been
foreseen and thus more personal responsibility will be
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assigned. However, the translation between likelihoods
and attributed personal responsibility is not direct.
The ascription of moral culpability depends upon the per-
ceived ability of the actor to have accurately estimated
the probabilities associated with the accident. Actors
who cannot reasonably be expected to have foreseen the
consequences of their behavior will be held less account-
able than those who should have been able to anticipate
the negative effects of their conduct. This reasoning is
the basis of the common tradition of excusing children
from responsibility. It also explains the legal tradition
of holding those with "special knowledge" more culpable
than those whose inexperience in a situation deprives them
of the ability to accurately anticipate the consequences
of their behavior or neglect.
This emphasis on foreseeability suggests a reinter-
pretation of findings which purport to demonstrate the
operation of defensive biases in the attribution process
(e.g., McKillip, 1972; Shaver, 1970a; Shaver and Carroll,
1970). According to this modification of Walster's (1966)
original hypothesis, it is in the interests of observers
to deny that they too could be involved in similar mis-
fortunes. This self protective bias leads them to take
into account actor characteristics such as the age and
status of perpetrators, and to assign less
responsibility
to actors who are similar to themselves.
According to the
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information processing interpretation, on the other hand,
observers consider personal characteristics of the actor
in order to assess his ability to have foreseen the con-
sequences of his behavior. Responsibility, therefore,
is attributed as a function of perceived foreseeability
and not as a function of perceived similarity. This in-
terpretation is supported by the lack of consistent find-
ings in previous tests of the defensive hypothesis, and
by Shaver's own results in the first experiment in his
1970 study in which attributed responsibility increased
with the age of the actor but was independent of the simi-
larity between actors and observers. Future research could
profitably be applied to defining the personal and situa-
tional characteristics which mitigate the perceived ability
of actors to anticipate the consequences of their actions.
The information processing model proposed here pro-
vides an interpretive framework for analyzing attributions
of responsibility, including the effects of actor-charac-
teristics and the severity of outcomes, without relying on
defensive interpretations. Although such self-serving
attributions may occasionally occur, it appears that much
of the attribution process can be explained by a non-
motivational information processing analysis.
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STORY #1
(Changes appearing in the high probability versions of the
stories are in parentheses.)
The owners of Appalachian Mining Corporation were
planning to open a new coal mine in the mountains of West
Virginia. The owners had heard about the possibility of
hitting pockets of trapped gas beneath the earth's surface.
When sparks from the mining drills hit trapped gas
,
explo-
sions can occur . If the pocket of gas is small , the
explosion is mild , but usually destroys drilling equipment
.
Larger pockets of gas are more dangerous . If hit they
cause severe explosions which often collapse the mine-
shafts and kill miners.
Other mining companies had operated successfully in
the area in the past and none of them had hit any pockets
of trapped gas (but recently some mines had been shut down
because they had hit pockets of trapped gas) . Since the
area was known to have large coal deposits the owners of
the Appalachian Mining Corporation went ahead and began
mining.
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OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY #1
Informed subjects read one of the following outcome de-
scriptions :
MILD OUTCOME
Seven months after the mine was opened and operating,
the drilling equipment broke through a layer of rock and
hit a small pocket of trapped gas. The explosion shattered
the drilling equipment but did not injure any of the miners.
SEVERE OUTCOME
Seven months after the mine was opened and operating,
the drilling equipment broke through a layer of rock and
hit a large pocket of trapped gas. A tremendous explosion
occurred. The drilling equipment was shattered and 16
miners were killed when the mineshaft collapsed on them.
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Measures of the Probabilities and Valences
Assigned to the Events Described in Story #1
(Informed subjects were asked to respond to the following
questions "as you would have had you not known that the
pocket of trapped gas was hit".)
1. Opening the mine was
good - bad
unwise - wise
justified - unjustified
safe - unsafe
(Subjects responded
to this item on six
8
-point Semantic Dif-
ferential type scales
,
each anchored at the
extremes
.
)
irresponsible - responsible
morally wrong - morally right
2. What is the probability that a pocket of trapped gas wou
be hit? 1
3. How bad or undesirable would it be if a pocket of
2trapped gas were hit?
4. If a pocket of trapped gas were hit, what is the prob-
ability that drilling equipment would be destroyed, but
people would not be hurt?
5. How undesirable would it be if drilling equipment were
destroyed?
1 All probabilities were measured on 11-point continua,
labelled from 0% to 100%.
2 All valences were measured on 8-point continua, labelled
"not at ail undesirable" and "extremely undesirable" at
the extremes
.
If a pocket of trapped gas were hit, what is the
probability that miners would be killed?
How undesirable would it be if miners were killed?
What is the probability that pockets of trapped gas
would not be hit and that neither drilling equipment
would be destroyed nor would miners be killed?
How desirable or good would it be if pockets of
trapped gas were not hit?
63
Measures of the Responsibility 3
Assigned to the Actor in Story #1
Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that a pocket of trapped gas was hit and
drilling equipment was destroyed, but miners weren't
hurt. How responsible or blameworthy for that
damage would the mine owners be?^
Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that a pocket of trapped gas was hit, equip-
ment was destroyed and miners were killed. How
responsible for their deaths would the mine owners be?
Informed/Mild Outcome Condition:
We know .that the drilling equipment was destroyed when
the drills hit a small pocket of trapped gas. How
responsible or blameworthy for that damage are the
mine owners?
Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that the drilling equipment was destroyed and
16 miners were killed when the drills hit a large
pocket of trapped gas. How responsible or blameworthy
for their deaths are the mine owners?
"in
All subjects were asked to answer these questions
terms of (the actors) moral and personal responsibility,
disregarding any legal liability".
All responsibility attributions were measured on
8-point
continua, labelled "not at all responsible" and
totally
responsible at the extremes.
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STORY #2
Betty was babysitting her 3 year old neighbor,
Monica, while the child's parents were at a movie. After
her dinner Monica began to play with Betty's dog. Monica
had often played with the dog in the past (the dog was
temperamental and had always avoided the child in the past)
.
While playing, Monica was pulling the dog's tail and teasing
him, but the dog didn't seem to mind and was, in fact,
very protective of Monica. (This clause was omitted from
the high probability version.) Betty thought about putting
the dog outside since she didn't want Monica scratched or
bitten by the dog, but decided it wasn't necessary.
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OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY #2
MILD OUTCOME
About h hour later, while Betty was in the kitchen,
she heard Monica scream. Betty rushed into the playroom
and found that the dog had become angry and had scratched
Monica's shoulder.
SEVERE OUTCOME
About % hour later, while Betty was in the kitchen,
she heard Monica scream. Betty rushed into the playroom
and found that the dog had become angry and had bitten
Monica's shoulder. The wound was severe and required
surgery
.
Measures of the Probabilities - and Valences
Assigned to the Events Described in Story #2
Leaving the dog in the room with the baby was:
good - bad
unwise - wise
justified - unjustified
safe - unsafe
irresponsible - responsible
What is the probability that the child will be hurt
at all by the dog?
How bad or undesirable would it be if the child were
injured by the dog?
What is the probability that the dog will scratch, but
not bite, the child?
How undesirable would it be if the child were scratched,
but not bitten, by the dog?
What is the probability that the dog will bite the
child?
How undesirable would it be if the child were bitten
by the dog?
What is the probability that the child would not be
injured at all by the dog?
How good or desirable would it be if the child were not
injured at all by the dog?
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Measures of the Responsibility
Assigned to the Actor in Story #2
Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the child was scratched by the dog.
How responsible or blameworthy for that injury would
Betty be?
Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the child was bitten by the dog . How
responsible or blameworthy for that injury would
Betty be?
Informed/Mild Outcome Condition
:
We know that Monica was scratched by the dog . How
responsible or blameworthy for that injury is Betty?
Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that Monica was bitten by the doq. How
responsible or blameworthy for that injury is Betty?
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STORY #3
The state of Colorado voted to build a dam on the
Platte River in order to store more water for the growing
city of Denver. Before the dam was completed, William
Smith and his family decided to build a house on land they
owned near the banks of the Platte River, downstream of
the proposed dam site. Mr. Smith knew that the Platte
had never flooded before (that the Platte had flooded 3
times in the past eight years) . If the river flooded be-
fore the dam was completed, it could ruin the house and en-
danger the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three
children. Mr. Smith knew that Spring rainfall was, on
the average, decreasing every year (and that the Platte
hadn't flooded since 1973) so it seemed highly unlikely
that the river would flood (again) before the dam was
built. With this in mind, he went ahead and built the
house
.
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OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY #3
'
MILD OUTCOME
A few months after the Smith family moved into their
new home and before the dam was completed, the Platte
River flooded. Although none of the Smiths were injured
in the flood, the house was ruined.
SEVERE OUTCOME
A few months after the Smith family moved into their
new home and before the dam was completed, the Platte
River flooded. The house was ruined and two members of
the Smith family were critically injured as the flood
swept through their house.
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Measures of the Probabilities
. and Valences
Assigned to Events Described in Story #3
1. Building the house before the dam was completed was:
good - bad
unwise - wise
justified - unjustified
safe - unsafe
irresponsible - responsible
2. What is the probability that the river will flood be-
fore the dam is completed?
3. How bad or undesirable would it be if the river were to
flood?
4. If the river were to flood, what is the probability
that the house would be damaged, but none of the family
would be injured?
5. How undesirable would it be if the house was damaged,
but the family was not injured?
6. If the river were to flood, what is the probability
that the house would be damaged and some of Mr.
Smith's family would be injured.
7. How undesirable would it be if the house was damaged
and some of the family were injured?
8. What is the probability that the river would not flood
before the dam was completed?
9. How good or desirable would it be if the river did not
flood?
Measures of the Responsibility
Assigned to the Actor in Story #3
Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the house was damaged by a flood, but
none of the family was injured. How responsible
or blameworthy would Mr. Smith be for that damage?
Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the house was damaged and some members
of the family were injured in a flood. How respon-
sible or blameworthy would Mr. Smith be for those
damages and injuries?
Informed/Mild Outcome Condition:
We know that the house was ruined in the flood. How
responsible or blameworthy for that damage is Mr.
Smith?
Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that the house was ruined and two members of
his family were critically injured when the river
flooded. How responsible or blameworthy for that
damage and those injuries is Mr. Smith?
STORY #4
John Shaw, a 17 year old youth, was arrested and
charged with arson. He confessed to setting fire to a
neighbor's garage and was in court to hear his sentence.
As is customary, the judge asked for the recommendations
of the defense attorney and the prosecuting attorney.
John Shaw's attorney told the judge that the boy had set
fire to the garage only because some schoolmates had dared
him to do it. The attorney also noted that damage to the
garage had been relatively minor and that no one had been
hurt, and that Shaw had promised to work after school to
pay for all the damage he had caused. Furthermore, the
attorney told the judge that the boy had a good reputation
in the community. He was a good student and had never been
in any kind of trouble before. (The previous two sentences
were omitted from the high probability version.) The
attorney said that Shaw's actions could best be regarded
as a foolish prank and urged the judge to put Shaw on
probation
.
The prosecuting attorney argued that John Shaw was too
dangerous to be out on the streets. (He advised the judge
that Shaw had been in the same kind of trouble before.
Shaw's first contact with the police came when he was 13.
He had started a brush fire while playing with matches
behind his house. Later when he was 15, Shaw had started
a fire in his school's auditorium. He was also
responsible
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for another fire in the town library one year later.)
The prosecutor said that Shaw's actions were an indication
of the boy's lack of concern for the lives and property
of other people. The prosecutor argued that Shaw might
some day set fire to another building and injure or kill
other people. With this in mind, he urged the judge to
send Shaw to the Youth Correctional Facility for one year
where he could be kept under supervision and given what-
ever psychiatric help he needed.
r
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OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY #4 "
MILD OUTCOME
The judge ordered John Shaw put on probation for one
year instead of sending him to the state correctional
facility. Four months after his appearance in Court,
John Shaw set fire to a warehouse in the business district
of the town. No one was in the building at the time, but
the warehouse was extensively damaged.
SEVERE OUTCOME
The judged ordered John Shaw put on probation for one
year instead of sending him to the state correctional
facility. Four months after his appearance in Court, John
Shaw set fire to a warehouse in the business district of
the town. The building was extensively damaged and two
men working in the warehouse died in the blaze.
Measures of the Probabilities and Valences
Assigned to the Events Described in Story #4
Letting John Shaw return to the community without
sending him to the state facility for supervision and
psychiatric care was:
good - bad
unwise - wise
justified - unjustified
safe - unsafe
irresponsible - responsible
What is the probability that Shaw will commit arson
again?
How bad or undesirable would it be if Shaw commits
arson again?
If he does commit arson again, what is the probability
that he will set fire to an unoccupied building?
How undesirable would it be if Shaw damaged or destroyed
an unoccupied building?
If he does commit arson again, what is the probability
that people would be injured or killed in the fire?
How undesirable would it be if people were injured or
killed in such a fire?
What is the probability that Shaw will not commit
arson again?
How desirable or good would it be if Shaw did not
commit arson again?
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Measures of the Responsibility
Assigned to the Actor in Story #4
Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that John Shaw did commit arson again and an
unoccupied building was damaged or destroyed. How
responsible or blameworthy for that damage would the
judge be because he let Shaw return to the community
without supervision or psychiatric care?
Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that John Shaw did commit arson again and
people were injured or killed in the fire. How re-
sponsible or blameworthy for the injuries or deaths
would the judge be because he let Shaw return to the
community without supervision or psychiatric care?
Informed/Mild Outcome Condition:
We know that John Shaw did commit arson again and a
warehouse was destroyed. How responsible for that
damage is the judge because he let Shaw return to the
community without supervision or psychiatric care?
Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that John Shaw did commit arson again and a
building was destroyed and two men were killed in the
fire. How responsible or blameworthy for that damage
and their deaths is the judge because he let Shaw
return to the community without supervision or psy-
chiatric care?


